The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a powerful pro-growth force for the American economy. Equally important, as we look back on it after 25 years, we also see that it taught us two important lessons. First, it showed that politicians with very different political philosophies on the right and on the left could agree on a major program of tax rate reduction and tax reform. Second, it showed that the amount of taxable income is very sensitive to marginal tax rates.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a powerful pro-growth force for the American economy. Equally important, as we look back on it after 25 years, we also see that it taught us two important lessons. First, it showed that politicians with very different political philosophies on the right and on the left could agree on a major program of tax rate reductions and tax reform. Second, it showed that the amount of taxable income is very sensitive to marginal tax rates.
This sensitivity of taxable income to marginal tax rates implies that a reduction of marginal tax rates causes much less revenue loss than traditional "static" estimates (that assume no behavioral response of taxpayers) imply. Although that lesson is still not fully incorporated into official estimates of the effects of major tax proposals, the 1986 estimates have caused the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Tax Committee to reflect taxpayer behavior more completely in their revenue estimates.
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I will use this 25 th anniversary of TRA86 to comment on these two important lessons.
Political Compromise
President Ronald Reagan and House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill were philosophical as well as political opponents. Ronald
Reagan was a conservative Republican. He also remembered the distortionary effects of the very high marginal tax rates that prevailed when he was a successful movie actor, rates that reached 92 percent at the federal level alone. Although the top federal rate had been reduced by the beginning of his presidency, the top tax rate in 1986 was still 50 percent. The tax code was also riddled with a wide range of special provisions that reduced revenue and distorted the economic choices of taxpayers in ways that decreased the value of what was produced and consumed in the American economy. President Reagan understood this and wanted it changed.
Speaker O'Neill was a liberal Democrat from Massachusetts who was less concerned about the high tax rates of wealthy taxpayers than about the employment and incomes of the middle and lower income constituents of the Democratic party. But the Speaker was convinced that many of the "tax expenditure" provisions of the tax code were unfair and harmful to the economy and that lowering high tax rates would strengthen the economy and therefore improve conditions for the broader electorate.
The willingness to trade the elimination of various tax expenditures for lower tax rates made TRA86 possible. The specific legislation was the result of secret meetings between the President, the Speaker, and their top staffs. The key feature of TRA86 is that it reduced the top tax rate to just 28 percent, thus lowering tax rates for millions of taxpayers. For those who had been paying the 50 percent rate, TRA86 meant that every extra dollar of pretax earnings produced 72 cents of net income instead of 50 cents, an increase of 44 percent.
The key to achieving bipartisan support for this dramatic rate reduction was that TRA86 also eliminated a large number of special tax provisions in a way that produced enough revenue at each level of adjusted gross income to make the overall TRA86 both revenue neutral and distributionally neutral. Put differently, the negotiations agreed to eliminate tax expenditures that raised significant revenue and then reduced tax rates at each level of adjusted gross income to offset fully the revenue increases that the base broadening would produce at that income level. 1 This balancing of increased revenue from base broadening and decreased revenue from rate reduction was done using the "static" analysis that assumed no taxpayer response. This meant that the actual revenue effect would be a substantial revenue increase.
The Behavioral Respose to Lower Marginal Tax Rates
The reduction in tax rates had three favorable effects on taxpayer behavior. The analysis of tax return data that I did a few years later 2 shows that the cumulative revenue effect of these three behavioral changes was quite large.
The most obvious effect is that the reduction in the high marginal tax rates increased the reward for extra effort and extra risk taking, leading to increases in earnings, in entrepreneurial activity, in the expansion of small businesses, etc.. 1 TRA86 also changed tax rules that affected corporations. Although the resulting increases in taxable income at the corporate level were largely offset by reducing the corporate tax rate, the offset was incomplete, allowing TRA86 to provide a small net reduction in taxes for taxpayers at each income level while being revenue neutral overall based on static (i.e., no behavioral response) calculations. The increase in GDP that resulted from the lower tax rates therefore caused TRA86 to raise revenue. A second effect was to cause individuals to shift some of their compensation from untaxed fringe benefits to taxable earnings. When cash income was taxed at 50 percent, executives and small business owners preferred expensive offices, company cars, first class travel, high cost health insurance, health club memberships, and other tax-free compensation to taxable cash wages and salaries. These fringe benefits might have been worth less to the individuals than they cost the firm to provide, but they were preferred to taxable cash as long as they were worth more than 50 cents per dollar of cost. When TRA86 allowed individuals to keep 72 cents of every cash dollar of compensation, payment in the form of fringe benefits and other perquisites became less attractive and taxable cash compensation jumped.
A third important effect on tax revenue was to reduce the forms of consumption that are favored by being tax deductible. The cost of a dollar of mortgage interest, local property taxes (that are often in effect payments for local services), charitable contributions, etc. rose from 50 cents per dollar paid to 72 cents, reducing the incentive to spend in these tax favored ways.
To assess the magnitude of these responses, I used a set of data provided to researchers by the Treasury Department. 3 These data provided individual tax returns (stripped of any identifying information) for more than 4,000 taxpayers. The important feature of these data is that they provided the tax returns of each individual in the Here is what that "difference in difference" comparison showed.
The net of tax share of those who initially had marginal tax rates of 42 to 45 percent rose by 25.6 percent and their taxable incomes rose by 20.3 percent. The difference between this group and the highest tax rate group in the rise of taxable income percentages was therefore 24.5 9 percent (i.e., 44.8 percent for the highest group minus 20.3 percent for the next group) while the difference in the net-of-tax share was 16.6 percent (42.2 percent minus 25.6 percent). The implied elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share is therefore the ratio of 24.5 to 16.6 or 1.54, even higher than that based on either group alone.
My other comparisons with the medium income group produced lower elasticity estimates although always greater than one. Other researchers, using different methods, produced a variety of estimates but these generally were not based on panel date and are therefore difficult to interpret.
Implications for the Revenue Effects of Tax Changes
The substantial responsiveness of taxable incomes to changes in marginal tax rates has important implications for the effect of tax changes on tax revenue.
Consider an across the board 10 percent reduction of all tax rates.
That reduction in all rates would take the 35 percent rate to 31.5 percent, the 15 percent rate to 13.5 percent, etc.. A traditional "static" analysis that ignores taxpayer response would imply that the 10 percent reduction in all rates would cause tax revenue to decline by 10 percent.
The likely change in taxpayer behavior implies that the reduction in rates would reduce tax revenue by substantially less. More specifically, if marginal tax rates now range from 10 percent to 40 percent, the across the board rate reduction would cause the range of marginal tax rates to become 9 percent to 36 percent. That implies that the marginal net-of-tax shares rise from 90 percent to 91 percent in the lowest tax bracket and from 60 percent to 64 percent in the highest tax bracket.
A rise from 60 to 64 percent is a 6.7 percent increase in the net-oftax share. An elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share equal to one would imply that taxable income would rise by 6.7 percent for taxpayers in this highest bracket. The combination of a 10 percent reduction in all marginal tax rates and a 6.7 percent rise in More specifically, the evidence based on the 1986 tax rate reductions shows that the response of taxpayers to reductions in marginal tax rates offsets a substantial portion of the revenue that would otherwise be lost. This implies that combining a broadening of the tax base that raises revenue equal to 10 percent of existing personal 13 income tax revenue 7 with a 10 percent across the board cut in all marginal tax rates would raise revenue equal to about four percent of existing tax revenue. With personal income tax revenue in 2011 of about $1 trillion, that four percent increase in net revenue would be $40 billion at the current level of taxable income or more than $500 billion over the next ten years.
Cambridge, Masschusetts
October 2011
